

Validujte bezpečnost automaticky a ze všech stran

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Poznáváte se?



Carbon Black.

SOPHOS



KASPERSKY



FORTINET

Forcepoint



EDR | NDR | EPP | SIEM | WAF | FW | SOAR | ...

Fungují ta řešení tak, jak si myslíme ?




PENTERA

*„After leading hundreds of red team projects, working with elite pen-testers, I came to realize that software, if built intelligently, **could do a much better job at pen-testing than humans...**“*

Arik Liberzon



Zranitelnosti



5 %
Zranitelnosti s aktivně zneužívaným exploitem

~1 %
Zranitelnosti aktivně exploitované ransomwarovými skupinami


CVSS: 8.0

CVSS: 5.5

**Budou mít neopravitelné zranitelnosti
skutečně na svědomí
přes 50 % průníků v roce 2026 ?**



Jak validovat bezpečnost?



**CÍLEM JE POKRÝT
VŠECHNY SLUŽBY
VYSTAVENÉ
POTENCIÁLNÍM
HROZBÁM**

Jak otestovat
najednou celou
infrastrukturu?

Pentera

2018

Světlo světa

370

Zaměstnanců

\$115M

Investice



Blackstone

INSIGHT
PARTNERS



evo/ution
EQUITY PARTNERS

20

Vertikál



Finance
11%



Bezpečnost & MSSP
9%



Business & Consulting
9%



Zdravotnictví
8%

58

Zemí



950

Zákazníků



Reference

>950
Zákazníků

BlackRock

Blackstone



Bell

GAP



teva

SEPHORA

MANGO

Deloitte.

NHS

Casey's



Leica

Paysafe:

TrueValue.



exabeam



PAUL HASTINGS



SKANSKA



mobileye™



RESILIENCE



FUJITSU

Co Pentera je?




Platforma pro kontinuální validaci bezpečnosti

Nesimuluje, nýbrž postupuje reálně

Poslední exploitsy a hrozby

Porozumění celému útoku od začátku do konce

Zranitelnosti, ale zejména špatná nastavení



Core, Surface a Cloud

Pentera Core

Validace interní infrastruktury. Bez agenta. HW/VM.

Pentera Surface

Validace externí infrastruktury. Ukradená hesla. OSINT.

Pentera Cloud

Validace cloudových a hybridních prostředí.

RansomwareReady modul

Credential Exposure modul



Co Pentera dělá?


Nepotřebuje agenta

Reálné etické postupy

Bezpečně

Autonomní (bez playbooků)

Pentera je algorithm-based,
nikoliv task-based software.



Jak to reálně funguje?

Blackbox/Greybox

Zapojím Penteru do uživatelské sítě.

Typicky po 10 minutách zachycuji první uživatelské přístupové údaje.

Jednou za pár hodin rozhoduji, jaké akce může Pentera provést.

V řádu hodin mám většinou první prolomené uživatele.

Dostáváme se ke sdíleným složkám, heslům prohlížečů, emailům...

AD assessment

(typicky 30% prolomených hesel)

A mohla bych to vidět?





Cracking / Attack node(s) status

302 Achievements

Search Achievements

- 10 Completed ransomware attack kill chain on the host
- 9.8 Uploaded malicious XML file
- 9.4 Gathered valuable information from host
- 9.2 Encrypted files on the host
- 9.1 Opened a remote access session on the host
- 9.0 Validated domain credentials
- 8.8 Exploited PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-34527) on host
- 8.8 Installed Hooking Malware
- 8.0 Cracked user hash using CPU
- 8.0 Escalated privileges

112 Vulnerabilities

Current Activity Category Details Actions Log 114 Approvals Host All Approvals

49 Critical	25 High	8 Medium	30 Low
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302 Achievements

16 Critical	118 High	100 Medium	68 Low
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Inject Spring4Shell p...	192.168.110.19	Approve
Inject Spring4Shell p...	WIN10A.PENTERA...	Approve
Inject Spring4Shell p...	CA.PENTERA.LAB	Approve
Inject Spring4Shell p...	PDC.PENTERA.LAB	Approve
Inject Spring4Shell p...	FILE2012.PENTER...	Approve

22 Discovered Devices

54% 14% 5% 27%

(12) Critical (3) High (1) Medium (6) Low

0 Windows Workstation	16 Windows Server	0 Windows	6 Linux	0 Mac Workstation	0 Network Devices	0 Other
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Win2019 (D) PDC.PENTERA.L... 192.168.110.2	Win2016 (D) DC2.PENTERA.L... 192.168.110.4	Win2016 (D) CRM2016.PENT... 192.168.110.5	Win2012R... CA.PENTERA.LAB 192.168.110.7	Win2012R... FILE2012.PENT... 192.168.110.8	Linux 192.168.110.11	Win2008R... PRTG.PENTERA... 192.168.110.12	Linux 192.168.110.19
Win2016 (D) EXCHANGE.PEN... 192.168.110.29	Win10 (D) WIN10A.PENTE... 192.168.110.30	Win10 (D) WIN10B.PENTE... 192.168.110.31	Win10 (D) WIN10C.PENTE... 192.168.110.32	Win10 (D) WIN10D.PENTE... 192.168.110.33	Win10 (D) WIN10G.PENTE... 192.168.110.34	Win10 (D) WIN10-DELIVEY... 192.168.110.35	Win10 (D) WIN10H.PENTE... 192.168.110.36
Win10 (D) WIN10-DELIVER... 192.168.110.37	Linux 192.168.110.50	Linux 192.168.110.110	Linux 192.168.110.253	Linux _gateway 192.168.110.254	Win2012R... DCRAN2012.pe... 192.168.111.2		

302 ACHIEVEMENTS | 112 VULNERABILITIES

- 4.6 Injected XSS payload 5
- 4.3 Found domain users with LAPS permissions on host 15
- 4.0 Accessed shared folder(s) 9
- 3.5 Validated local credentials 3
- 3.4 Uploaded malware to host 5
 - Host: 192.168.110.33
 - Host: 192.168.110.32
 - Host: 192.168.110.35
 - Target: 192.168.110.33
 - Target: 192.168.110.33
- 3.4 Uploaded malware to host via LOLBAS 11
- 3.3 Opened remote control channel on the host 46
- 2.8 Revealed domain's groups and users 5

Adversary Level
Add To Report



8.7 Password can easily be cracked leveraging leaked password
 Username: william
 Context: PENTERA

4.7 Host can be forced to authenticate by a rogue server
 Domain: pentera

5.5 Captured credentials over SMB
 User: william
 Host: 192.168.110.32

8.0 Cracked user hash using CPU
 Username: william
 Context: PENTERA

9.0 Validated domain credentials
 User: william
 Domain: PENTERA

3.3 Opened remote control channel on the host
 Host: 192.168.110.33

8.8 PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-34527)
 Host: 192.168.110.33

Details

5.5 Captured credentials over SMB

Parameters
Domain: pentera

Results
Host: 192.168.110.32
User: william
Type of Creds: ntlmv2
Context: Domain
Credentials: ****

Insight
An attacker may steal credentials by impersonating hosts and tricking users to authenticate with him over SMB, and use them in order to access hosts or services in the network, which may lead to sensitive data theft or manipulation and possibly to a complete take-over of the hosts or services.

Details
Time: Feb 28, 2023 11:03

- Related Actions**
- Created user account
 - NTLM Relay
 - Active Directory Reconnaissance
 - GeneratePayload
 - Performed hash dump using Relay
 - ChromeCredsExtraction
 - RelayedUserCreds
 - Sniffed user credentials



Overview

Vulnerabilities

Attack Map

Hosts

Users

Actions Log

MITRE

Footprints

Report

Details & Input



Run



302 ACHIEVEMENTS

112 VULNERABILITIES

- 0.0 Escalated privileges
- 7.9 Emulated deletion of shadow copies
- 7.2 Executed code remotely on the host
 - Host: 192.168.110.33
 - Host: 192.168.110.32
 - Host: 192.168.110.33
 - Host: 192.168.110.33
 - Host: 192.168.110.35
 - Host: 192.168.110.33
- 7.2 Enumerated files on the host
- 7.1 Found a user with privileged RCE capabilities
- 7.0 Potential credentials were found in script file(s)
- 6.4 Detected Java deserializable object
- 6.4 Detected ASP.NET deserializable object



Details

7.2 Executed code remotely on the host

Parameters

Domain: 192.168.110.33
 Host: 192.168.110.33
 User: pentera_s1b5oxhyhr
 Password: ****

Results

Engine: Powershell
 Obfuscation Method: FOR_COMMAND
 Obfuscation Level: BASIC
 Command: set
 qKyP=8xNIW=340tYlJSegs7JR.yKwMVG5Zpc2nE-o
 diF1Qubz9kCHaml/fDBUAhTXOPv&&for %W in
 (29,35,23,33,19,16,58,14,51,11,20,14,1,33,36,34,4,
 3,32,54,61,23,36,48,3,54,54,33,32,36,34,33,60,33,
 30,56,59,3,35,32,29,36,55,10,62,57,13,13,36,34,16
 ,9,49,36,34,32,61,62,19,35,53,3,11,14,36,34,14,32,
 30,35,37,14,37,30,35,24,50,49,2,37,36,28,15,55,62
 ,57,39,3,57,28,41,55,55,57,26,24,57,13,57,57,35,5
 7,47,41,57,56,57,57,15,57,33,46,57,59,15,57,15,57
 ,54,41,57,2,57,57,44,57,47,23,57,24,41,57,44,57,5
 4,15,57,11,57,57,7,57,54,57,57,61,57,57,23,57,47,
 23,57,2,57,57,1,57,54,56,57,2,41,57,1,57,47,46,57,
 14,23,55,56,57,48,3,57,4,41,55,17,57,47,41,57,37,
 23,57,45,57,33,7,57,19,41,55,6,57,47,8,57,43,23,5
 5,47,57,26,35,57,28,41,55,18,57,48,41,57,3,57,55,
 44,57,39,46,57,56,23,55,8,57,33,56,57,43,41,57,42
 ,57,26,7,57,28,41,55,56,57,47,7,57,37,23,55,39,57,
 33,3,57,10,23,55,24,57,26,46,57,19,41,55,61,57,48
 ,41,57,61,23,57,46,57,48,30,57,11,15,55,46,57,33,
 0,57,25,23,55,61,57,33,23,57,43,23,55,55,57,26,41
 ,57,56,23,55,8,57,48,3,57,49,41,55,61,57,26,30,57,
 22,57,57,32,57,26,15,57,25,57,55,8,57,39,57,57,61
 ,15,57,63,57,47,0,57,24,41,57,27,57,54,3,57,11,15,
 57,1,57,54,10,57,61,57,57,42,57,54,33,57,24,41,57
 ,23,57,47,7,57,24,41,57,23,57,54,35,57,14,23,57,2

302 ACHIEVEMENTS

112 VULNERABILITIES

9.1	Opened a remote access session on the host	1
9.0	Validated domain credentials	1
8.8	Exploited PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-34527) on host	3
8.8	Installed Hooking Malware	2
8.0	Cracked user hash using CPU	1
8.0	Escalated privileges	3
7.9	Emulated deletion of shadow copies	1
7.2	Executed code remotely on the host	47
7.2	Enumerated files on the host	1
7.1	Found a user with privileged RCE capabilities	3



8.7 Password can easily be cracked leveraging leaked password

Username **william**
Context **PENTERA**

4.7

5.5

11:03:17
Feb 28, 2023

8.0 Cracked user hash using CPU

Username **william**
Context **PENTERA**

Details

8.0 Cracked user hash using CPU

Parameters
Username: william
Context: PENTERA
Hash: ****

Results
Cracked password: ****
Hash type: NTLMv2
Cracking engine: CPU
Cracking duration: 00:00:01.627

Insight
An attacker might capture user password hashes during his attack, then try and crack them using various hash cracking tools. The purpose will be to gather as many user credentials as possible to escalate his attack, take-over hosts in the network and possibly learn the password policy of the organization.

Details
Time: Feb 28, 2023 11:03

Related Actions
Cracked hash using CPU



Conti Ransomware Campaign

REvil Ransomware Campaign

MAZE Ransomware Campaign

Lockbit 2.0 Ransomware Campaign

MS08-067 Microsoft Server Service Relative Path Stack Corruption

Malicious C2 Traffic

ARP Poisoning

Cached Credentials

DHCP Spoofing

Binary-less Exploitation - Powershell

Name Resolution Protocols (LLMNR/NBNS/mDNS)

Living off the Land Binaries

Privileged User Management in a Windows Domain

LDAPs Relay Prevention/Detection

MS-SAMR Protocol

MS17-010 Eternal Blue SMB Remote Windows Kernel Pool Corruption

Stop Service

Conti campaigns stop live services on Windows hosts to undermine the ability to recover data from the encryption process. Stop services is usually achieved by executing the following commands:

```
Code Block
net stop "Acronis VSS Provider" /y
net stop "Enterprise Client Service" /y
net stop "SQLsafe Backup Service" /y
net stop "SQLsafe Filter Service" /y
net stop "Veeam Backup Catalog Data Service" /y
net stop AcronisAgent /y
```

File System Artifacts

The following file system artifacts are often observed in sequence on hosts attacked by Conti campaigns.

Step	Operation	Purpose
1	CreateFile	Opens the document for reading and writing.
2	ReadFile	Reads data from the document.
3	WriteFile	Writes encrypted data onto the document.
4	WriteFile	Adds key blob to encrypted document at the end of the file.
5	CloseFile	Closes encrypted document.
6	CreateFile (Read Attributes)	Opens encrypted document.
7	SetRenameInformationFile	Renames document to add an attack-identifier as the file extension.
8	CloseFile	Closes encrypted document.

Supplemental Material

[Conti_URL.txt](#)
[Conti_HASH.txt](#)

References

- <https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-265a>
- <https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-vs.-conti-ransomware>
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/c/vision-one-tracking-conti-ransomware.html
- <https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/tau-threat-discovery-conti-ransomware/>
- <https://blog.minerva-labs.com/conti-ransomware-built-to-bypass-edrs-prevented-by-minerva>
- <https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/02/16/conti-ransomware-evasive-by-nature/>
- <https://adversary.crowdstrike.com/adversary/wizard-spider/>
- <https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102/>

Pokud...

Řešíte produktivitu bezpečnostních týmů.

Chcete snížit náklady na testování třetími stranami.

Potřebujete relevantní výstupy s důkazy.



Děkuji za pozornost

